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Abstract 
 
This Thesis tests Meyer’s and Strickmann’s (2011) International Relations (IR) theoretical 
framework on the material-ideational nexus in European defence against a case with 
extraordinary evidence of material change: the European defence sector after the Cold War 
(1989–1999). The aim is to investigate how the interplay of material and ideational factors shaped 
European armament cooperation in this period. Furthermore, the author seeks to derive policy 
recommendations for the ongoing European Union (EU) defence integration process, also said to 
be driven by material change. The Thesis finds that the stark post-Cold War material challenges 
did lead to an ideational shift towards closer European armament cooperation. This shift, 
however, was not as pronounced as it could have been, considering the magnitude of material 
change and scope for collaboration. Additionally, material pressures exacerbated existing 
tensions between different actors and interests in the defence domain. For the current EU 
defence integration process, this implies that the cohesive effects of material change should not 
be taken for granted. Instead, a more unitary and comprehensive institutional structure is 
needed, which still accommodates the different capacities and preferences of member states 
regarding European armament cooperation.
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How Did the Interplay of Material and Ideational Factors Shape European 
Armament Cooperation Post-Cold War? 
 
Introduction 
There is a current surge in European security and defence policy, announced by the publication 
of the European Union (EU) Global Strategy, the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP) and the 
EU-NATO Joint Declaration in 2016. For European armament collaboration, the most important 
instrument put forward in these documents is the European Defence Fund (EDF). If launched 
under the upcoming Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) from 2021, the EDF would allocate 
an annual €500 million from the EU budget to collaborative defence research and another €5 
billion of EU and member states contributions to joint capability development and procurement 
(European Commission 2016) – an absolute novelty for the EU, which has previously merely 
coordinated, but not funded such projects.   
According to the EU institutions and member states, this ideational advance is necessitated by 
the advent of severe material challenges in the defence sector. Among them are the dwindling 
security guarantee provided by the United States (US) and the concurrent rise of defence powers 
like Russia and China. Furthermore, Europe struggles with the repercussions of military conflicts 
in its Southern and Eastern neighbourhood, as well as the emergence of hybrid threats to its 
internal security. EU member states with their shrinking militaries, defence budgets and arms 
industries, the argument goes, are ill-equipped to tackle these material challenges on their own. 
They need to join their efforts in doing so (see for instance European Commission 2017b and 
2016; European Council 2013; European External Action Service 2016; European Parliament 
2016a, 2016b and 2013a; EU Institute for Security Studies 2016).     
What is lacking in both the political and academic realm so far, however, is a holistic 
understanding of how exactly the interplay of material and ideational factors contributes to 
international defence cooperation. For this purpose, Meyer and Strickmann (2011) developed a 
theoretical framework, aiming to show how material changes – capabilities, which are inadequate 
to rising threats, as well as shifts in capability distribution and affordability – can open a ‘window 
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of opportunity’ for contesting the ideational and material status quo and establishing a new 
ideational outlook on European defence based on cooperation and unity. 
In the following, the merits of Meyer’s and Strickmann’s theoretical framework for explaining 
the phenomenon of European cooperation in the defence sector, arguably a least-likely case for 
international collaboration to occur due to the sovereignty trade-off involved, will be examined 
more closely. This will be done by subjecting the authors’ prime hypothesis that material change 
leads to ideational change to a theory test by means of the process-tracing method. The test case 
will be the first decade after the Cold War (1989–1999). In this period, substantial developments 
in military technologies and conflict environments, coupled with critically reduced defence 
budgets and military arsenals, arguably offered particularly strong material incentives for 
European states to cooperate on the issue of armaments. 
Aside from testing Meyer’s and Strickmann’s theoretical framework and thereby answering 
the research question How Did the Interplay of Material and Ideational Factors Shape European 
Armament Cooperation Post-Cold War?, this approach also allows to derive some important 
policy recommendations for the present EU defence integration process. Notably, whether 
periods of stark material change are particularly susceptible for establishing new ideas on 
European defence and in which ways the clash of old and new conditions could open avenues for 
future collaborative solutions.   
It will be argued that, although the stark post-Cold War material challenges led to an ideational 
shift towards closer European armament cooperation, this shift was not as dramatic as the scale 
of material change and potential for collaboration would have suggested. In fact, the 1990s 
highlighted divisions among different actors in the defence domain, which continue to hamper 
European cooperation to date. Regarding the ongoing EU defence integration process, this 
indicates that the unifying power of material challenges should not be overestimated. Instead, an 
intentional process towards the integration of the institutional armament collaboration 
landscape should be launched, while respecting its actors’ diversity in capacities and preferences. 
To explore the interaction of material and ideational factors in European armament 
cooperation in more detail, the remainder of the Thesis will be divided into two parts. The first, 
theoretical part will begin with a description of the unique characteristics of the defence sector, 
underlining the difficulties of introducing international cooperation to this field. Subsequently, 
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the International Relations (IR) theoretical traditions of neorealism and constructivism and their 
accounts, based on material or ideational factors respectively, as to why international armament 
cooperation occurs nonetheless, will be presented. Finally, Meyer’s and Strickmann’s 
consolidatory approach will be introduced, looking at the interaction of material and ideational 
factors in shaping European defence cooperation.  
At the start of the second, empirical part of this Thesis, the choice of methodology will be 
explained, which will guide the ensuing theory test of Meyer’s and Strickmann’s framework 
against the case of European armament cooperation post-Cold War. A short history of previous 
European armament cooperation efforts will follow, before the actual case study of the post-Cold 
War period will be conducted. Lastly, the case study will be analysed, and a conclusion on the 
applicability of Meyer’s and Strickmann’s framework, as well as policy implications for the 
ongoing EU defence integration process, will be drawn. 
1. The specifics of the defence sector 
Before embarking upon the above tasks, the specific characteristics of the defence sector, making 
it an intriguing subject of analysis for academics and a primordial sphere of concern for 
governments, demand reiteration. These specifics can be divided into the hybrid function, market 
structure and definition of the defence sector.   
To begin with, a competitive Defence Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB) is seen as an 
integral element for exercising sovereign defence powers. Defence industries supply national 
governments with the military technologies and products required to preserve their monopoly of 
force internally, as well as their territorial integrity and national interests externally (Cobble 2000: 
131; see also DeVore 2017). At the same time, there are also prominent economic arguments 
made for maintaining indigenous arms industries. They include job opportunities for 
manufacturing and high-skilled labour forces, foreign-currency reserves and balance of payments 
through defence exports, as well as innovative hubs for technological spin-offs (Bitzinger 2003; 
Hartley and Martin 2003; Sandler and Hartley 1995).  
 The strong link between security and economic concerns is also reflected in the defence 
market, where competitive logics only apply imperfectly. On the demand side, national 
governments conventionally present the exclusive (‘monopsony’) buyers of armaments. 
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Consequently, they are largely in the position to determine the size, structure and composition 
of defence industries. On the supply side, through difficult market entry and exit conditions, the 
defence market tends to be dominated by a small number of large firms (‘monopolies’ or 
‘oligopolies’). This, in turn, gives them disproportionate influence over the competition for and 
execution of defence contracts (Hartley 2008 and 1988; Sandler and Hartley 1995). 
Lastly, the defence sector comprises a multitude of industries, like aeronautics and electronics, 
whose revenues only partly depend on defence sales. To cover all industrial activities, it is 
therefore necessary to adopt an inclusive definition of the defence sector, being ‘firms providing 
military equipment as also the supporting layer of businesses supplying the technology to 
produce defence output’ (Matthews 1992: 68).  
It follows that the defence sector is a heterogeneous construct, characterised by the 
interrelation of security and economic concerns, military, political and industrial actors, and 
defence and civil enterprises. Introducing external competition to this highly sensitive and 
complicated environment automatically entails a loss of sovereign control, hence disincentivising 
states to cooperate.  
2. The interplay of material and ideational factors in IR theory and practice 
Notwithstanding these seemingly unfavourable conditions, armament cooperation in Europe has 
occurred since the 1950s. IR theory has different explanations as to why that is the case. In the 
following, two of the most prominent theoretical approaches in IR theory – neorealism and social 
constructivism – and their take at this puzzling empirical phenomenon will be presented. The 
section will conclude by introducing a theoretical cross-fertilisation effort by Meyer and 
Strickmann, seeking to reconcile these two traditions and offering a promising alternative for 
explaining the occurrence of armament cooperation in Europe.   
There are several criteria to order IR theories, and the prevalence they give to material or 
ideational factors in shaping the course of international relations is one of them. That is, whether 
states’ interests and thus policy preferences are exogenously determined by the material 
conditions of the international system or whether they are endogenously created through a 
discursive process of ideas and meanings. Material factors in this context are understood as ‘brute 
material forces’, which exist independently of ideas. They include socio-economic productive 
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factors or destructive military assets (Wendt 1999: 94; see also Philpott 2001: 49). Ideational 
factors, by contrast, are defined as the collective interpretations that convey social meaning upon 
these ‘brute material forces’. They ‘provide people with reasons why things are as they are and 
indications as to how they should use their material abilities and power’ (Adler 1997: 322).  
Although this distinction is by no means binary and rather a matter of degree, neorealists 
conventionally present the materialist side of the argument, whereas constructivists subscribe to 
the ideational position (Sørensen 2008). Given the limited space, the myriad of variants existing 
within these theoretical traditions must remain unexplored for now. Instead, the subsequent 
paragraphs will focus on tracing their main tenets regarding materials and ideas and the ensuing 
implications on the analysis of European armament cooperation.  
Neorealism, also called ‘structural realism’, believes that it is the structure of the international 
system, which determines the behaviour of states. It assumes that because of a lack of 
overarching authority issuing and enforcing order, international politics is an inherently anarchic 
affair. Consequently, states, as rational and uniform central units of concern, must resort to self-
help strategies to ensure the necessary level of security for their national survival. The main 
currency in this system is power. The behaviour of states is therefore conditioned by the ‘balance 
of power’, the relative distribution of material capabilities in the international system, measured 
in socio-economic and military assets. Depending on the number of resulting power poles, the 
international system can be unipolar, bipolar or multi-polar. Less mighty states have the choice 
to ‘bandwagon’ with the hegemonic power in the system or ‘balance’ it by creating alternative 
centres of power. In this context, the emergence of alliances is possible, and they can become 
institutionalised. These cooperative arrangements, however, will only serve the interests of the 
great powers who created them (see for instance Waltz 1979 and 2000).   
 From the neorealist perspective, European cooperation in defence is essentially assessed as 
the outcome of how European states position themselves vis-à-vis other power poles, notably the 
US. Albeit no longer a hegemonic power in a unipolar world order, the US with its vast military 
capabilities and arms industries is still considered the dominant global defence player. European 
defence cooperation can therefore be read as an effort to ‘balance’ the US (see for instance Pape, 
2005; Posen 2006 and 2004). In the field of armaments, this could be achieved by creating pan-
European defence companies researching, developing and producing exclusively European arms. 
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An alternative neorealist case could be made for Europe ‘bandwagoning’ with the US. Viewed in 
this way, European armament cooperation would serve to generate the necessary capabilities for 
European states to counter threats in their immediate neighbourhood autonomously, while 
signalling their continued viability as defence partners to the US through active ‘burden-sharing’ 
within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (see Dyson and Konstantides 2013). In both 
cases, major European defence powers like the United Kingdom (UK), France and Germany would 
lead the way for such processes, but only in areas where it would be in their national interest to 
do so.   
Contrarily to neorealism, constructivism disputes the immutability of anarchy as an 
international condition and its inescapable stimulus on states to behave in a selfish and 
competitive way. Instead, as Wendt (1992: 395, original emphasis omitted) famously proclaims: 
‘Anarchy is what states make of it’. He explains that international features championed by 
neorealism, like the self-help system or power politics, are socially constructed and thus flexible 
concepts. They emerge as a product of the dynamic interaction of policy actors, whose identities 
in turn are also shaped by their unique historical and cultural experiences. This leaves notable 
leverage to language, socialisation and the influence of pioneering individuals – Finnemore and 
Sikkink (1998) call them ‘norm entrepreneurs’ – in defining the appropriate policy response in a 
specific context. The policies stemming from this normative process can either be pessimistic and 
competitive, as predicted by neorealism, but also optimistic and cooperative in character. 
Following this argument, constructivism understands ideas not as mere causes, but as all-
encompassing constituents of international politics. Consequently, constructivism does not focus 
on the distribution of material capabilities, interests and power in the international system, but 
on the distribution of ideas which give meaning to the former (Wendt 1999).  
In the case of European defence cooperation, constructivism is mainly preoccupied with 
whether a convergence of the strategic cultures of individual European states is taking place, 
which would allow for the emergence of a trans-national and distinctly ‘European’ approach to 
security and defence (Howorth 2014: 209; see for instance Giegerich 2006; Meyer 2006; Norheim-
Martinsen 2011). In line with this reasoning, it could be argued that by means of the socialisation 
of political, military and industrial actors in various European armament forums, a convincing 
narrative for a common European interest in collaborating in defence research, development and 
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production has emerged. This trans-national European defence identity now exerts normative 
pressure on European states to join their efforts and work towards a common European defence 
technological and industrial base (EDTIB) to the benefit of a shared and competitive military 
capability pool.  
Both approaches, the neorealist and the constructivist one, have been subjected to notable 
criticism from the respective opposite camp regarding their engagement with ideational and 
material factors. Wendt, for example, takes issue with the inherently instrumental value 
attributed to material capabilities. He writes: ‘Neorealism ‘fetishizes’ material capabilities in the 
sense that it imbues them with meanings and powers that ‘can only correctly be attributed to 
human beings’’ (1999: 109, quoting Dant 1996: 496). With the theoretical traditions’ quarrel 
about the overriding importance of material or ideational factors, the important question of how 
these two types of factors interact to influence the realities of international politics is largely side-
tracked (Sørensen 2008).   
Against this background, Meyer and Strickmann (2011) introduce a theoretical cross-
fertilisation effort, aiming to remedy this shortfall and ‘solidify constructivism’ by incorporating 
material realities in their analysis of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Taking 
this, as they call it, ‘modernist constructivist’ approach, enables the authors to show 
[…] how material changes have interacted with pre-existing ideational and material conditions 
to create opportunities for actors to challenge ideas, norms and culture in national and 
transnational defence policy in Europe (62–63).    
Their theoretical framework deserves closer examination, starting with the authors’ prime 
hypothesis. In a nutshell, Meyer and Strickmann posit that material change leads to ideational 
change: material change → ideational change. In this equation, material change presents the 
independent variable (the cause), whereas ideational change is the dependent one (the 
outcome). Their main argument is then broken down into four phases:  
(1) cause → (2) mediation → (3) contestation → (4) change.   
Or, in more detail: (1) changes in material factors (the adequacy of military capabilities for tackling 
threats, the relative distribution of military capabilities, and the affordability of defence 
equipment) (2) necessitate a confrontation with the current material and ideational 
circumstances, thereby (3) creating a ‘window of opportunity’ to contest the status quo and argue 
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in favour of new cooperative arrangements, and eventually (4) enabling an altered ideational 
outlook on European defence matters to take hold (see reproduction of Table 2 below).  
 
From Material to Ideational Change: An Illustration 
Phase 1: 
Cause → 
Phase 2:  
Mediation → 
Phase 3:  
Contestation → 
Phase 4:  
Change 
Material 
changes 
Interaction of pre-
existing ideas and 
material 
structures 
Social agency and 
interaction at national 
and EU levels  
Ideational 
change 
Capabilities 
inadequate to 
threat 
Identity crisis National or 
transnational social 
movements 
Identity change 
Shifts in 
capability 
distribution 
Politicized public 
debate 
National and 
European parties and 
institutions 
Cultural change 
Shifts in 
affordability of 
capabilities  
Elite/technocratic 
debate 
National/transnational 
coalitions of norm 
entrepreneurs 
Normative 
change 
 
 
The theoretical eclecticism of Meyer’s and Strickmann’s approach has attracted criticism, 
notably that it betrays the social constructivist aim of challenging the inescapability of 
international anarchy (Dyson and Konstadinides 2013: 117). Nonetheless, the authors insist that 
their approach has purely practical reasons: ‘A pragmatic approach is recommendable and 
justifiable insofar as it will tell us more about the research problem: the interaction between 
changing material structures and ideas’ (Meyer and Strickmann 2011: 67). Meyer’s and 
Strickmann’s pragmatism is refreshing in that it goes beyond the previously examined ‘tit-for-tat’ 
debates between constructivists and realists and instead offers a productive way in which to 
engage both theoretical traditions simultaneously, without losing their respective identity.   
The authors’ application-oriented attitude moreover mirrors one of the distinguishing 
characteristics of ‘analytic eclecticism’ as identified by Sil and Katzenstein (2010: 412): ‘a 
pragmatist ethos, manifested concretely in the search for middle-range theoretical arguments 
(Source: Meyer and Strickmann 2011: 70, Table 2, formatting adapted to Thesis) 
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that potentially speak to concrete issues of policy and practice’. Indeed, Meyer and Strickmann 
are clear on the practical benefits, but also on the limitations of their approach: whereas it does 
not allow for precise predictions about when and how exactly ideational change will take place, 
it still offers a ‘better probabilistic handle’ on the material and ideational circumstances under 
which such changes are likely to occur and successfully endure (Meyer and Strickmann 2011: 77–
78). The latter is of special importance for policy-makers when considering the most suitable 
context for promoting new policies in European defence.  
In sum, Meyer and Strickmann made a very valuable and useful addition to the academic 
literature on the CSDP. In the same article in which the authors conceptualise their theoretical 
framework, it is already tested in a cursory manner against three examples: Europe’s reaction to 
the conflicts in Former Yugoslavia (as evidence for capabilities inadequate to threat), the growing 
US military arsenal and the declining Russian one in comparison to European equipment (as 
evidence for shifts in capability distribution), and economically necessitated military reforms (as 
evidence for shifts in affordability of capabilities). The authors find that in all three instances, 
material factors helped the ideational growth of the CSDP.  
As Howorth (2014: 211) notes, however, constructivist approaches to the CSDP like Meyer’s 
and Strickmann’s, will only unfold their full potential if ‘scholars working in this broad field come 
down from the abstract ethereal heights and get their hands dirty with empirical reality’. The aim 
now is to honour his request and subject Meyer’s and Strickmann’s modernist constructivist 
framework to a more systematic theory test.   
3. Testing the theory: case selection, methodology and sources 
The empirical phenomenon of choice for this endeavour will be European armament cooperation, 
a subset of European defence cooperation, during the immediate post-Cold War period from 
1989 until 1999. The case has been selected because it displays an unusually high value on the 
independent variable in Meyer’s and Strickmann’s theoretical framework – material change. This 
makes the test about to be performed a strong one, as the theory’s predictions about the value 
on the dependent variable in this case – ideational change – are more certain and specific. 
Therefore, if the theory’s predictions hold, they present an especially convincing evidence of its 
working (Levy 2008: 7; Van Evera 1997: 79).    
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It is widely acknowledged that the end of the Cold War imposed extreme material challenges 
on the European defence sector (see for instance Anthony et al. 1990; Bitzinger 2003 and 1994; 
Guay and Callum 2002; Gummet and Walker 1990; Hayward 2000; Neal and Taylor 2001; 
Markusen 1999). The level of military armament and defence spending dropped dramatically, 
while new conflict environments and technological advances cropped up, leaving European states 
with no apparent choice but to cooperate in order to create economies of scale and sustain their 
indigenous defence industries. If Meyer’s and Strickmann’s prime hypothesis is correct, this 
strong evidence of material change should lead to accordingly strong evidence for ideational 
change: material change → ideational change. Taking ideational change to mean a departure 
from the status quo – as explained above states are naturally very reluctant to cooperate in the 
defence sector – this would mean the existence of clear evidence for an ideational commitment 
towards a significantly broader and deeper international armament cooperation in Europe.  
Furthermore, the case study has been selected because it resembles an ongoing situation of 
high policy interest, namely the current EU defence integration process. Similar to the post-Cold 
War period, nowadays it is argued that grave material changes necessitate a closer European 
cooperation in armaments. Emerging conflicts in Europe’s Eastern and Southern neighbourhood, 
and hybrid challenges to its internal security, render capabilities inadequate to threat. The 
armament of emerging powers like China, and the retracting of the US security guarantee, 
produce shifts in capability distribution. Finally, defence budgets strained from the 2008 financial 
crisis, and the ever-rising costs of technologically sophisticated defence equipment, create shifts 
in the affordability of capabilities (see for instance European Commission 2017b and 2016; 
European Council 2013; European External Action Service 2016; European Parliament 2016a, 
2016b and 2013a; EU Institute for Security Studies 2016).  
The findings from the case of European armament cooperation in the immediate post-Cold 
War period, can therefore offer important political implications for defence industrial 
collaboration in Europe today. As Van Evera (1997: 83–84) notes, the benefits of selecting a case 
A resembling the conditions of a case B of current policy concern, is that the subsequent findings 
are more likely to ‘travel’ from case A to case B. If the findings corroborate Meyer’s and 
Strickmann’s prime hypothesis, it means that material changes offer fertile ground for advancing 
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ideational changes, and therefore the defence policy proposals presently put forward on the EU-
level are more prone to being successful and ‘stick’ with the relevant stakeholders.  
The method used for testing the theory against the case of post-Cold War European armament 
cooperation, selected for high material change and policy-relevance, is process-tracing. Process-
tracing allows to follow the chain of causality closely and explore how certain initial conditions 
lead to specific outcomes in the case in question (Levy 2008: 11–12; Van Evera 1997: 64–66). The 
four-step procedural set-up of Meyer’s and Strickmann’s theoretical framework (cause → 
mediation → contestation → change) lends itself intuitively to a process-orientated method. To 
examine the causal process in the case of European armament cooperation post-Cold War, one 
must consequently look for evidence of large-scale material changes, interacting with existing 
ideational and material conditions in the broadly nationalised defence sector, causing a form of 
dissonance and finally promoting a changed ideational outlook to the benefit of closer 
international armament cooperation in Europe.  
As sources for this case study and its surrounding chapters, primary literature in the form of 
official government or international organisation publications, as well as secondary literature in 
the form of media and think tank reports, academic books and journal articles were utilised.1 
Furthermore, to complement the desk research, two semi-structured elite interviews with open-
ended questions were conducted. As Leech (2002: 665) points out, this type of interview allows 
researchers to tap experts’ in-depth insights, while still offering a comparably focused source for 
hypothesis testing. The interviews took place in Brussels in March 2018 with two high-ranking 
national policy officials currently working in the field of EU defence. They spoke in their personal 
capacity and were able to contribute highly valuable expertise on the varied aspects of armament 
cooperation (military, political, industrial) as well as extensive experience as active professional 
participants in the developments from 1989–1999.2 
                                                           
1 The primary sources were either taken from the official websites of the institutions, or from the following digital  
archives: The University of Pittsburgh’s Archive of European Integration (AEI) (available at http://aei.pitt.edu/), 
the University of Luxembourg’s Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe (CVCE) (available at 
https://www.cvce.eu), and the Yale University Law School’s Avalon Project for Documents in Law, History and 
Diplomacy (available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/). All online sources referenced in this Thesis were last 
accessed on 19 May 2018. 
2 A catalogue of the interview questions can be found at p. 45 of this Thesis. 
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The remaining, second part of this Thesis will proceed as follows: Firstly, to set the scene for 
the subsequent investigation, a brief history of European armament cooperation before the end 
of the Cold War will be presented. Secondly, the case study – European armament cooperation 
after the Cold War (1989–1999) – will be examined. As explained, broad material changes and 
their interaction with present material and ideational structures will be outlined, potentially 
allowing for the introduction of a changed ideational attitude. Thirdly, the case will be analysed 
to see in how far it corresponds to Meyer’s and Strickmann’s prime hypothesis (material change 
→ ideational change) and their three explanatory hypotheses (cause → mediation, mediation → 
contestation, contestation → change). Fourthly, a conclusion on the findings will be drawn and, 
finally, policy recommendations for the ongoing EU defence integration process will be issued. 
4. A brief history of European armament cooperation 
Although they are rarely mentioned in today’s academic and policy discourse, there have been 
notable efforts to cooperate on the issue of armaments before the 1990s. They will be presented 
below, prior to turning to the actual case of European armament cooperation post-Cold War. The 
aim is to introduce the most relevant players, dynamics and events of European armament 
cooperation, which can then later be referred to during the case study.    
After World War II, European armament cooperation was mainly meant to counter the 
increasing military threat posed by the Soviet Union as well as to integrate and simultaneously 
contain the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in a network of Western institutions. As DeVore 
(2013: 6–7) notes, because of the devastating war experience, European states initially lacked the 
economic means and competitive industries to guarantee their own security. The US therefore 
provided significant financial and technological transfers for their rearmament and sponsored the 
first transatlantic institutions in the field of security and defence, chiefly the NATO in 1949. In the 
early years of NATO and under the auspices of the US, several institutional bodies were launched 
to promote armament standardisation, technological progress and alliance cooperation (ibid.: 9–
10).   
Meanwhile in Europe, the Benelux states, France and the UK signed the so-called Brussels 
Treaty in 1948. It established the ‘Western Union’ and provided the base for a mutual defence 
guarantee as well as a common military organisation in Europe, functions later largely subsumed 
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by the NATO. In 1954, following the aborted initiative of introducing a European Defence 
Community (EDC), the Brussels Treaty Organisation was re-named into the ‘Western European 
Union’ (WEU) and admitted Germany and Italy as members (Modified Brussels Treaty 1954). In 
the early post-war context, the WEU had two main functions regarding armaments: (1) 
supervising the disarmament of Germany and the general distribution of weapons on the 
European mainland (Modified Brussels Treaty, Protocol No. III and Protocol No. IV 1954), and (2) 
providing a forum for WEU members to consult on cooperation in defence research and 
development (R&D), standardisation, production and supply (Bailes and Messervy-Whiting 2011: 
9–13; WEU Council 1955).  
The unconditional US support for European defence industries, however, drew to a close, 
when the security situation became more stable, notably due to the advent of the nuclear 
deterrence scheme and the technological and economic catch-up of Western European states 
(DeVore 2013: 11–12). The US moved from providing grant-based military assistance to intently 
pursuing arms sales abroad (Leepson 1979). Additionally, the ‘Buy American Act’ was introduced, 
protecting the US armament market with up to 50 per cent of domestic costs (Assembly of WEU 
1977). By the 1960s, DeVore (2013: 12–13) consequently remarks, the greatest material challenge 
for Western European armament industries had shifted from the Soviet armament process to US 
commercial competition.     
To react to US requests for a more committed European ‘burden-sharing’ in defence, but also 
to better support armament cooperation among European states, in 1968 the NATO ‘Eurogroup’ 
was established (ibid.: 14). The Eurogroup was an informal association, consisting of regular 
meetings of the defence ministers of the Western European NATO members and specific working 
groups. Its spirit is encapsulated in a speech of British Secretary of Defence Healey from the same 
year: 
[…] there are areas of military co-operation open to the European members of NATO which 
may not always be open to the same degree for the United States; the geographical unity of 
Europe itself creates certain common interests which can only be fully exploited in common 
policies (as quoted in ‘The Eurogroup in NATO’ 1972: 291).  
As DeVore (2013: 14) points out, however, the Eurogroup lacked the institutional backbone 
and political commitment to achieve notable results. It especially suffered from France’s absence 
from NATO activities as well as smaller member states’ fears to antagonise the US with an 
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exclusive ‘European club’ within NATO (North Atlantic Assembly 1972: paras. 35–48). As a 
remedy, the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) was created outside of NATO in 
1976. It included all Eurogroup members plus France. The declared aims of the IEPG were to 
promote the efficient use of defence budgets, the standardisation of equipment, and the 
competitiveness of the EDTIB, especially vis-à-vis the US (Matthews 1992: 38).  
Next to the NATO, the WEU and the IEPG, the European Communities (EC), too, expressed 
institutional interest in European armaments. The defence sector, however, strictly belonged to 
the competences of its member states (Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
1957: Art. 223). Therefore, the EC could only seek to exert indirect influence based industrial or 
commercial grounds (Guay 1997). In 1975, the European Commission published an Action 
Programme for European Aerospace, targeting Europe’s ailing civil and military aerospace 
industries. In 1978, the European Parliament followed-up with the Klepsch Report, asking the 
Commission ‘to submit to the Council in the near future a European action programme for the 
development and production of conventional armaments’ (as quoted in Assembly of WEU 1978: 
para. 101). These initiatives were succeeded by the Parliament’s Fergusson Report in 1983, which 
suggested a joint European framework for defence procurement and exports (Guay 1997: 405). 
Yet, at the time all initiatives faltered. Member states saw them as an unwarranted interference 
into their national sovereignty. This attitude changed to some limited extent with the advent of 
the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986, creating a common market space in Europe (ibid.: 406).  
In the 1970s, the Cold War was far from over. Détente policies, like the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks (SALT), mixed with aggressive moves, like the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, still 
made for an insecure international environment. The 1979 NATO decision to station US 
intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe, however, marked a turning point for many 
European states (see Brauch 1987). Pacifist and neutralist movements spread, calling for 
definitive nuclear disarmament. It became increasingly difficult for political decision-makers to 
justify the allocation of limited public resources towards comprehensive defence budgets 
(Assembly of WEU 1982). Additionally, the rapidly rising costs of defence equipment outstripped 
economic growth, then hampered by a worldwide recession. Nonetheless, the proliferation of 
different equipment types across Europe continued, duplicating research, training and 
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maintenance expenses, jeopardising interoperability of alliance forces, and driving arms exports 
to politically instable regions (Assembly of WEU 1977 and 1978).  
It was clear that the challenges of the final Cold War phase urgently demanded a united 
European response. Neither the transatlantic NATO, nor the economically-focused EC, however, 
appeared suited for this purpose. Consequently, in 1984, WEU member states decided to 
revitalise the WEU as the institutional framework for discussing European defence and security 
matters (Bailes and Messervy-Whiting 2011: 14–15; Declaration by the WEU Foreign and Defence 
Ministers 1984). Alongside the WEU, the IEPG also experienced a revival. It commissioned a report 
for enhancing EDTIB competitiveness, resulting in an adamant call for the opening, liberalisation 
and ‘secularisation’ of Europe’s traditionally nationalised, protected and privileged defence 
markets (IEPG 1986; Matthews 1992: 40–42).  
This chapter sketched the course of European armament cooperation; from its US-induced 
beginnings in the 1950s, to the pressing Cold War strategic, economic and technological 
imperatives in the 1980s. In doing so, some of the most important historical advances in the 
institutional organisation of European armaments have been highlighted: the transatlantic 
standardisation within NATO and its Eurogroup, the inception and reactivation of the distinctly 
European forums of the WEU and IEPG, as well as early efforts by the EC to regulate economic 
armament aspects.   
What follows is the actual case study of European armament cooperation in the first decade 
after the Cold War. This period differs from the previous years in the sheer magnitude of the 
material change affecting the European defence sector. Whereas some of these shifts directly 
relate to the termination of the Cold War, such as the reduction of Soviet and US troops and 
equipment in Europe, others present the culmination of more general and long-term trends, like 
the gradual liberalisation of national markets or the growing technological lead of civil industries.  
5. The case: European armament cooperation post-Cold War (1989–1999) 
This chapter presents the case study of European armament cooperation post-Cold War. It will 
start by outlining the evidence for large-scale material change. This will be done by using the three 
categories proposed by Meyer and Strickmann: (1) capabilities inadequate to threat, (2) shifts in 
capability distribution, and (3) shifts in the affordability of capabilities. Then, the chapter will turn 
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to ideational change in the same period, as expressed in political and industrial progress in 
European armament cooperation, and its relation to material change as well as to pre-existing 
ideational and material circumstances. The purpose of this chapter is to lay the empirical 
groundwork for the subsequent analysis section, which will test Meyer’s and Strickmann’s 
theoretical framework on the material-ideational nexus against the reality of the case study by 
means of the process-tracing method.   
5.1 Material changes 
It is difficult to separate different types of material change both functionally and causally. 
Nonetheless, for the sake of clarity and the theory test to be performed, the following paragraphs 
will summarise the material changes in the European defence sector as subdivided into the 
adequacy, distribution and affordability of military capabilities. These categories will allow to 
consider post-Cold War changes in the areas of defence technologies, conflict environments, arms 
control, the transatlantic defence posture, defence budgets, and unit costs of equipment.   
5.1.1 Capabilities inadequate to threat 
When it comes to the material category of ‘capabilities inadequate to threat’, two interrelated 
post-Cold War tendencies are of special interest: (1) the increasing relevance of civil technologies 
for the military realm, and (2) the challenges posed by new military conflicts, notably the 1991 
Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo campaign.  
Beginning with the first development, the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA), a widespread 
concept in military and strategic circles in the 1990s, cannot go unmentioned. It implies that 
contemporary trends, such as the increased importance of Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) for the conduct of warfare and the integration of different weapons systems 
into a ‘system of systems’, amount to a revolution, which will lastingly transform the military’s 
internal and external workings (Cohen 2016; Davis 1996).   
The RMA concept reflected and coined ongoing trends in military technology: Primordial 
importance in combat began to be assigned to command, control, communications and 
computing (C4), as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). The ‘new’ 
electronics systems installed within the ‘old’ weapons platforms now set the former’s value. 
Lastly, complementarily to the established strategic domains of air, land and sea, growing 
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attention was given to space and cyberspace (Anthony et al. 1990; Guay and Callum 2002; 
Hayward 2000; Matthews 1992; Schmitt 2000).   
Accordingly, civil technologies gained increasing relevance for the military realm. To enhance 
the performance of existing capabilities and drive down the prices of new purchases, 
governments turned to the civil sector, which held the technological lead in promising fields like 
electronics and telecommunications, while offering commercially viable, ‘off the shelf’ solutions 
(Hayward 2000; Matthews 1992; Schmitt 2000). This made the definition of strictly ‘defence’ 
industries more and more problematic and prompted Schmitt (2000: 9) from the formerly WEU 
Institute for Security Studies to write: ‘It is the latter [civil industries] that have become the true 
strategic sectors and the heart of the modern armaments industry’.   
The military conflicts in the Persian Gulf (1991) and Former Yugoslavia (1999) were 
simultaneously testbeds and catalysts for these shifts in technology. They showcased the 
technological superiority of US equipment as well as shortfalls in European capabilities. The Gulf 
War, especially the US-led allied Operation Desert Storm, was labelled ‘the coming of age of air 
power’ and even ‘the first space war’ (Lambeth 1999: 63, 75). By combining air capabilities – like 
stealth aircraft and laser-guided bombs – with strategic enablers from space – like navigation 
support and environmental information from satellites, the alliance was able to take control of 
air and land space at record speed and with a comparably low loss rate for allied forces (ibid.).   
The relative military success of the Operation Desert Storm, however, proved difficult to 
replicate during the NATO Operation Allied Force in 1999. In Kosovo and the preceding air 
campaign in Bosnia in 1995, terrain was less accessible, targets more mobile and political support 
significantly lower (ibid.). Given the pressure to minimise casualties, special importance was 
accorded to precision-guided weapons for attacking infrastructure nodes and unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) for intelligence gathering. During this operation in ‘Europe’s backyard’, the US 
bore the brunt of equipment and manpower, while European states grappled with capability 
shortages (International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 1999).  
As an example, the US contributed the largest share of aircraft and 80 per cent of the 
munitions. By contrast, UK guided-weapons did not function properly from a high altitude and 
under poor weather conditions. Additionally, for crucial combat-support missions like air-to-air 
refuelling, the US provided 150 tanker aircraft, whereas France and the UK had each only 12 
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tankers available, Italy two and Germany none (ibid.). These dire circumstances led observers to 
conclude: ‘If they have any pretensions to an independent military capability, this deficiency is a 
clear lesson for the Europeans’ (ibid.: 290).  
Hence, the 1990s exposed the opportunities, but also the limits of new defence technologies 
as well as the urgent capability needs, which European states would need to satisfy in order to 
play a more serious and independent role in global security and defence. 
5.1.2 Shifts in capability distribution  
As with capability adequacy, capability distribution in the post-Cold War armament context 
comprises two central, interrelated developments: (1) the introduction and advance of arms 
control measures, and (2) the new transatlantic defence posture resulting from reduced threat 
levels. 
In terms of arms control agreements, they had already been part of the détente policies in the 
late 1970s and 80s (see for instance SALT, INF Treaty). With the Conventional Forces in Europe 
(CFE) Treaty in 1990, an additional agreement was signed, which specifically addressed the lower 
level of armaments (battle tanks, combat vehicles and aircraft, artillery, attack helicopters) 
stationed by NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) members in the territory ‘from the 
Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains’ (Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1990). 
Albeit their individual technical and strategic effects can be disputed, arms control measures in 
general contributed to building public and political trust and an altered threat assessment 
regarding the Soviet Union (Anthony et al. 1990; Nye 1989).  
Additionally, after the fall of the Berlin wall, some European states faced their very own 
challenges in capability distribution. In Germany, the reunification process and subsequent 
military reform necessitated a massive reduction of troop numbers as well as a large sell-off of 
excess equipment, for instance to former WTO members like Hungary, as well as to Southeast 
Asian and African countries, and NATO allies like Portugal and Turkey (Anthony et al. 1990; 
Interview I and II conducted by author 2018).  
To reflect the transformed security environment, NATO introduced a ‘New Strategic Concept’ 
in 1991. This updated strategy stepped back from the possibility of a full-scale, surprise attack by 
the Soviet Union or one of its allies against the territorial integrity of a NATO member. Instead, it 
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warned against the emergence of smaller, but more ‘multi-faceted’ and ‘multi-directional’ threats 
(North Atlantic Council 1991: Part I). Consequently, NATO members vowed to: 
[…] move away, where appropriate, from the concept of forward defence towards a reduced 
forward presence, and to modify the principle of flexible response to reflect a reduced reliance 
on nuclear weapons (ibid.: para. 39).  
The strategy furthermore declared that ‘the overall size of the Allies’ forces, and in many cases 
their readiness, will be reduced’ since ‘the maintenance of a comprehensive in-place linear 
defensive posture in the central region will no longer be required’ (ibid.: para. 45). 
NATO’s ‘New Strategic Concept’ was the expression of a general post-Cold War strategic turn 
towards flexibility and mobility. Defensive capabilities were given the preference over offensive 
ones. Equipment was now required to sustain the full range of operations, including crisis 
prevention and peacekeeping, and do so over a longer period of time. Additionally, rapid reaction 
forces were needed to carry out out-of-area operations on short notice (Gummet and Walker 
1990; Interview II conducted by author 2018; Matthews 1992).  
This strategic turn also set new defence technological requirements, as discussed in section 
5.1.1. Decreasing armament and threat levels after the Cold War therefore brought about 
important changes in the European and transatlantic perspective on force planning.  
5.1.3 Shifts in affordability of capabilities 
The last category of material change studied here – shifts in the affordability of capabilities – is 
also characterised by two interconnected processes: (1) the shrinking size of national defence 
budgets, and (2) the rising unit costs of defence equipment.   
After their Cold War heydays, defence budgets in Western Europe decreased considerably, as 
the following figures demonstrate: From 1989 until 1999, the joint military expenditure of all 
Western European states fell by almost 13 per cent from $281 billion to $245 billion (absolute 
figures taken from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 2017a). In the same 
period, the top-three European defence powers saw their national military expenditure decrease 
by 12 (France), 26 (Germany) and 20 (UK) per cent (absolute figures taken from SIPRI 2017b). As 
examined in section 5.1.2, this contraction was largely owed to the equally diminished perceived 
military threat emanating from the Soviet Union.   
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Concurrently, the unit costs of defence equipment continued to grow. This phenomenon 
became especially acute in the 1990s through the advent of new and sophisticated defence 
technologies (see section 5.1.1). As Kirkpatrick (1997) notes, the rise can be attributed to the 
exploitation of technological progress and accordingly increasing expenses for personnel, testing 
equipment and prototypes. The following examples illustrate the problem: Excluding inflation, 
the costs of US tanks tripled between 1960 and 1980. Likewise, the overall costs of French combat 
aircraft models increased dramatically: Mirage F-1 stood at FF26.7 billion (1973), Mirage 2000 at 
FF104.5 billion (1983), and the announced Rafale fighter was set at a staggering FF202+ billion 
(Schmitt 2000: 6–7).  
To spread the higher incurred costs among a larger number of units, production runs needed 
to be lengthened. This would allow to exploit ‘economies of scale’ and additionally ‘economies of 
learning’, indicating the beneficial learning curve of employees engaged in repetitive production 
processes (Moravcsik 1990: 67). Indeed, with domestic markets largely saturated, European arms 
manufacturers turned towards foreign markets to rationalise their costs (Interview II conducted 
by author 2018; Markusen 1999; Schmitt 2000). Global defence markets, however, became more 
and more contested by relatively recent competitors, like Israel and South Africa or the former 
Soviet republics of Ukraine and Belarus, and more established ones: From 1992 until 1998 alone, 
the US increased its global arms market share from 40 to 49 per cent (IISS 1999 and 1998).   
It became evident that aside from exporting arms additional coping strategies were needed. 
One of these strategies was cooperating with other states on the development and production of 
expensive weapons. This option will be examined in the subsequent section on ideational change. 
For now, it shall suffice to note that the lower buying power of European states – characterised 
by decreasing budgets and increasing costs – joined the previously discussed changes in the 
adequacy and distribution of military capabilities and put significant material burden on the 
European defence sector.  
5.2 Ideational change  
Similar to material change, the evidence for ideational change in the European armament sector 
from 1989–1999 is abundant. Most observers agree that ideational change towards closer 
European cooperation in armaments was largely industry-led (see for instance Bitzinger 1994; IISS 
1998; Markusen 1999; Matthews 1992; Schmitt 2000). Yet, this advance could not have existed 
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without a corresponding regulatory framework. Therefore, the following sections will examine 
ideational change in both forms: (1) as a bottom-up initiative from the arms industries, and (2) as 
a top-down process through political developments.  
5.2.1 Bottom-up: industrial restructuring 
Confronted with the aforementioned material challenges – changes in the adequacy, distribution 
and affordability of capabilities – as well as pressure from their primary customers – national 
governments – to drive down costs, many firms operating in the European defence sector had to 
adapt their ideational attitudes or face market exit. The results were, often concerted, industrial 
strategies, like rationalisation through sell-offs and lay-offs, diversification into civil business, and 
internationalisation by cross-border cooperation with other firms (Anthony et al. 1990: 11–16; 
Gummet and Walker 1990: 50; Schmitt 2000: 11–14).  
The latter strategy of internationalisation is especially relevant regarding European armament 
cooperation. The motivations for firms to engage in transnational collaboration were manifold: 
gaining access to foreign technologies and markets, sharing risks and costs of R&D and 
production, and achieving greater bargaining power with customers (Bitzinger 1994; Markusen 
1999). In ascending order of economic integration, there were different options for international 
cooperation: licenses, co-production, co-development, strategic alliances, joint ventures, as well 
as mergers and acquisitions (M&A) (Bitzinger 1994: 175–183).   
Industrial internationalisation, however, did not proceed evenly; neither across the Atlantic, 
nor among European states or industrial branches. In the US, with explicit government support, 
defence industrial consolidation already occurred early in the 1990s, largely in the form of 
national or transatlantic M&A, and mostly to increase domestic or foreign market share. This put 
substantial pressure on European companies to follow suit. Industrial consolidation in Europe 
began later and long remained a national affair. Regarding international cooperation, less 
integrative schemes, notably joint ventures or co-development and -production, were preferred. 
They allowed to accommodate national specifics and retain strategic leverage separately. The first 
large European cross-border M&A at defence prime-contractor level happened only at the end of 
the 1990s (Neal and Taylor 2001; Markusen 1999; see below). 
Differences also existed among European states. At the end of the 1980s, French and Italian 
defence industries were widely under public ownership. German and British defence industries 
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were mostly privately-owned (Hartley 1988: 42). State-owned firms tend to be more ‘inward-
looking’, geared towards national markets and guarded from commercial pressures. These 
circumstances were mirrored in the procurement and cooperation behaviour of arms-producing 
states. From 1985 until 1989, France purchased 80 per cent of its major weapons systems 
domestically and sourced only 20 per cent internationally through co-development or imports. In 
the FRG, the ratio of national to international weapons procurement, by contrast, stood at almost 
equal 45 to 55 per cent (Moravcsik 1990: 66).  
Lastly, some industrial branches in Europe internationalised faster than others. The aerospace 
sector, due to its extensive R&D and production costs, multi-national programmes and civil 
business, was the first in Europe to forge transnational companies through M&A (Schmitt 2000: 
15–29). Beforehand, Moravcsik (1990: 76) observed that ‘[a]ll combat aircraft being produced or 
developed in Europe, except the French Mirage 2000 and Rafale, […] are already co-developed 
or co-produced’. Furthermore, in the 1990s, weapon platform providers engaged in a series of 
partly cross-border acquisitions of electronics firms to retain the competitive edge in weapons 
production (ibid.: 69). Land and sea systems providers, however, were slower to consolidate 
(Schmitt 2000: 2).   
The year 1999 proved decisive for cross-border defence industrial consolidation. Through a 
‘merger of mergers’, a ‘duo-poly’ of European aerospace companies surfaced: BAE Systems and 
the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) (ibid.: 79). The former presents the 
‘vertical’ integration of a specialised defence company, whereby the platform provider British 
Aerospace PLC (BAe) – itself the result of several mergers – diversified and updated its business 
model by acquiring the electronics company Marconi Electronic Systems (MES) (ibid.: 50). With 
the $2.3 billion US defence and aerospace holdings of MES, BAe furthermore became a 
transatlantic company and thus gained precious access to the US market (The Economist 2002).  
The EADS, in turn, is an example of ‘horizontal’ integration. As ‘the first transnational 
aerospace and defence champion’, it is combining wide-ranging business activities in both civil 
and military aviation, space, helicopters and missiles (Schmitt 2000: 39–40, 50). It came about 
through a merger of the French Aérospatiale-Matra with the German DaimlerChrysler Aerospace 
(Dasa) in October 1999, later joined by the Spanish company Construcciones Aeronáuticas S.A. 
(CASA) (ibid.: 37–39). However, despite its unifying intentions, EADS still displayed signs of 
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national division, with one French and one German chairman, chief executive and head office 
each (Neal and Taylor 2001: 347; The Economist 2002).  
The formation of the two aerospace giants was accompanied by a row among governments 
and companies, which showcased the complexities and sensitivities involved in European 
armament cooperation. Since 1998, the ‘national champions’ of France (Aérospatiale), UK (BAe), 
Spain (CASA), and Germany (Dasa), as well as Sweden’s Saab and Italy’s Finmeccanica had been 
negotiating to create a joint European Defence and Aerospace Company (EDAC). In anticipation, 
France had already begun to incrementally privatise its aerospace industry. Parallelly, but 
unbeknownst to their competitors, Dasa and BAe, united by their focus on private investment 
and shareholder value, prepared a merger of their own. In December 1998, however, MES was 
put up for sale and purchased by BAe, nullifying all previous arrangements (Schmitt 2000: 29–37).   
The move was heavily criticised. The UK government would have favoured a French-British 
solution to buttress the countries’ bilateral defence declaration at the 1998 Saint-Malo summit. 
Most of the companies involved in the original deal furthermore saw BAe’s sudden change of 
mind as an end to an inclusive European solution, which was now ruled out by the size of BAE 
Systems as the third-largest defence contractor worldwide (ibid.: 36–37). A Dasa official was 
quoted: ‘What we have in the UK is the creation of a vertically organised powerhouse. Any cross-
border partnership would by definition have been horizontally oriented’ (Flight International 
1999). The German-Franco response to this rebuttal was the creation of the EADS.   
To summarise, internationalisation was one of many industrial strategies adopted by European 
defence companies to adjust to the post-Cold War material pressures. The shift towards more 
industrial armament cooperation, however, did not preclude the perseverance of nation-specific 
strategic concerns and complicated corporate arrangements.   
5.2.2 Top-down: political initiatives 
There are two principal ways in which European political actors accompanied this defence 
industrial ideational change towards closer European armament cooperation from 1989 until 
1999: (1) the framing of a European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and (2) 
institutional advances in the organisation of European armaments.  
The first move – defining a CFSP – was instrumental for providing a normative direction 
regarding the strategy and requirements to which a future EDTIB would have to cater. Before the 
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1990s, European defence was long perceived as an issue taken care of within NATO with 
occasional WEU assistance (Mathiopoulos and Gyarmati 1999: 66). NATO’s ‘New Strategic 
Concept’ from 1991, however, explicitly sanctioned the emergence of a distinctly European 
defence position (section 5.1.2; Taylor 1994).   
The Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 introduced the CFSP as one of the three pillars constituting 
the EU. It stated that 
[t]he common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of 
the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time 
lead to a common defence (Official Journal of the EC 1992: Art. J(4)). 
Nonetheless, the early 1990s were still marked by the transatlantic nature of European defence 
and the WEU as its appropriate institutional home. In 1992, the WEU Council adopted the 
‘Petersberg Declaration’, denominating the so-called ‘Petersberg Tasks’, for which its members’ 
forces could be deployed: (1) humanitarian and rescue tasks, (2) peacekeeping tasks, and (3) tasks 
of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (WEU Council 1992). Furthermore, 
in 1996, NATO Ministers agreed on a closer prospective NATO-WEU cooperation, including joint 
exercises and equipment sharing (North Atlantic Council 1996). 
After a stagnating period of ‘Eurosclerosis’, the EU was meanwhile gripped by a wave of 
economic integration, which would soon engulf other policy fields, too. The SEA – set to be 
completed in 1992 – indirectly affected the EDTIB by liberalising the European market, also for 
dual-use technologies. It moreover institutionalised the European Political Cooperation (EPC), a 
predecessor to the CFSP (Guay 1997; Moravcsik 1990; Official Journal of the EC 1987). Although 
less ambitiously than some member states would have hoped, the Amsterdam Treaty reformed 
the CFSP pillar in 1997, inter alia by incorporating the ‘Petersberg Tasks’ into the EU Treaty (Treaty 
of Amsterdam 1997).    
The real break-through for the development of independent European defence capabilities 
was then reached at the Franco-Anglo summit at Saint-Malo in 1998, following the devastating 
experiences from Former Yugoslavia (Interview I conducted by author 2018). The Declaration 
stated: 
[…] the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military 
forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
international crises (Joint Declaration on European Defence 1998).  
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The Saint-Malo propositions were taken up by the 1999 Cologne Council, which definitively 
transferred the WEU functions to the EU, including the authority to implement the ‘Petersburg 
tasks’ (European Council 1999a). The succeeding Helsinki Summit translated the quest for 
European defence autonomy into the first concrete ‘Headline Goals’: ‘to deploy within 60 days 
and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full 
range of Petersberg tasks’ (European Council 1999b: para. 28). 
Like the maturation of the CFSP, the interplay of NATO, EU and WEU also shaped the evolution 
of the institutional organisation of armaments in Europe. The WEU was long seen as the primary 
European armaments organisation, before being overtaken by the EU. Prior to this transition, 
when the IEPG dissolved in 1992, its tasks were first transferred to the WEU. As a result, the 
Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) was created. In 1996, it was joined by the Western 
European Armaments Organization (WEAO), providing managerial services for defence research 
and technology (R&T) projects (WEAG 2005; Schmitt 2003: 20–24).  
The calls for a more comprehensive European Armaments Agency (EAA), covering the full 
range of European defence procurement, grew louder. But there was no agreement on how it 
should look like. France, fearing for its large public investments, favoured a more protectionist 
approach towards European armaments. The UK, Germany, Italy and Sweden, by contrast, 
preferred an agency operating closer to business principles. Smaller member states generally 
opposed the prospect of an agency solely run on the terms of Europe’s big defence powers 
(Markusen 1999: 44–45; IISS 1998: 277).  
Disenchanted with the lacking institutional progress through the WEU, large arms-producing 
states began to promote separate and narrower formats (DeVore 2013: 21). In 1996, France, 
Germany, Italy and the UK launched the Organisme Conjoint de Coopération en matière 
d’armement (OCCAR), to offer management support for large multi-national programmes. 
Additionally, in 1998, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK signed a Letter of Intent 
(LoI) to create a more favourable legal and political environment for the cross-border 
restructuring of Europe’s defence industries (ibid.: 18; Schmitt 2003: 24, 26). 
Alongside, the EU continued to exert limited regulatory influence on the EDTIB through a 
patchwork of different policies: a dual-use export control regime, a voluntary code of conduct on 
arms exports, R&D framework programmes including dual-use technologies, the review of 
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mergers and acquisitions, and structural funds for regions undergoing a defence conversion 
process. Furthermore, the Commission launched several documents urging for a pan-European 
approach to defence industrial matters (Schmitt 2003: 29–35; Guay and Callum 2002: 766–768): 
Challenges Facing the European Defence-Related Industry: A Contribution for Action at European 
Level (Commission of the EC 1996), and Implementing European Strategy on Defence-related 
Industries, including a Draft Action Plan for the Defence-related Industry (Commission of the EC 
1997).    
Yet, it was not until the EU completely took over the WEU’s functions through the Cologne 
Council that it subsumed the institutional organisation of European armaments, too. In 2004, a 
European Council Decision established the European Defence Agency (EDA) within the EU 
framework (Official Journal of the EU 2004). The WEAG and the WEAO ceased to exist in 2005 
and 2006 respectively. The WEU, at this point consisting only of an Assembly and a Secretariat, 
was fully dismantled in 2011 (Bailes and Messervy-Whiting 2011).   
All in all, it was the material strains of the 1990s which made an independent European 
defence capacity a salient issue on the international political agenda. Notwithstanding the 
resulting ideational advances in European armament cooperation, it must be realised that its 
activities continued to be organised in competing institutional forums and in a strictly 
intergovernmental manner, subject to the usual inter-state controversies and obstructions.   
6. Analysis: the relation between material and ideational change 
After conducting the case study on the interaction of material and ideational factors and their 
influence on European armament cooperation post-Cold War, its findings can finally be analysed 
against the backdrop of Meyer’s and Strickmann’s theoretical framework about the material-
ideational nexus in European defence. The ensuing paragraphs will first recapitulate Meyer’s and 
Strickmann’s main theoretical tenets as well as the resulting hypotheses and case study design, 
before turning to investigating the results.  
6.1 Preliminary considerations 
Meyer and Strickmann (2011) started their deliberations from aspects of political change, which 
they saw underexplained by conventional constructivist approaches. Whereas constructivism 
argues that it is ideational factors (identities, cultures, norms) inducing ideational change, it 
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usually does not provide convincing clues regarding the specific properties of the ideational 
change in question: e.g. the direction it takes (affirming or contesting the status quo), as well as 
the actors empowered or weakened over its dynamics. Meyer and Strickmann concluded that 
there had to be something more than ideas involved in this process and that materials, 
traditionally emphasised by realist approaches, mattered for its outcome, too.   
Consequently, they set out to explore the influence that material factors, more precisely 
changes in material factors, have on ideational results. They laid out a theoretical framework, in 
which certain types of material change would lead to according forms of ideational change: 
material change → ideaƟonal change. This would happen through the interaction of those 
material changes with existing material and ideational conditions, contesting present 
assumptions and eventually accommodating an altered ideational attitude:  
cause → mediation → contestation → change.  
The aim of this Thesis was to test their framework against a case with an especially high value 
on material change: European armament cooperation post-Cold War (1989–1999). This would 
allow to answer the research question: How Did the Interplay of Material and Ideational Factors 
Shape European Armament Cooperation Post-Cold War? Moreover, it would hold important 
policy implications for the current EU defence integration process, which is also said to be 
motivated by extensive material change. The working assumption for testing Meyer’s and 
Strickmann’s theory was that material change in the European defence sector, contesting the 
status quo, would generate an ideational change, equally contesting the status quo (nationalised 
defence industries), and thus pave the way for closer European armament cooperation. 
The case study was conducted by first tracing material developments in the European defence 
sector post-Cold War and then juxtaposing them with ideational processes in the same area, field 
and period. The evidence found for both types of change is summarised on the subsequent page. 
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6.2 Tracing the process towards change 
This is the analysis of the case study’s findings and how they compare to Meyer’s and Strickmann’s 
theory: To begin with, and perhaps least surprisingly, the stark material changes in the European 
defence sector post-Cold War led to some ideational change in industry and politics towards 
closer European armament cooperation. The process leading to this ideational result can be 
traced as follows. 
At the end of the Cold War era, the (perceived) military threats facing European states and 
their NATO allies changed drastically. The most threatening scenario was no longer a quick, high-
intensity and -casualty tank battle after a Warsaw Pact surprise attack through Germany’s Fulda 
Gap. Instead, future military equipment was now expected to withstand more mobile and less 
fatal attacks, hitting farther from home, lasting longer, and engaging the full operative spectrum. 
Material and ideational changes in the European defence sector post-Cold War (1989-1999) 
Evidence for material change 
(1) Increasing relevance of civil 
technologies for the military realm 
Capabilities inadequate to threat 
(2) Challenges posed by new military 
conflicts 
(3) Introduction and advance of arms 
control measures Shifts in capability distribution 
(4) New transatlantic defence posture 
(5) Shrinking size of national defence 
budgets Shifts in affordability of capabilities 
(6) Rising unit costs of defence equipment 
Evidence for ideational change 
(1) Defence industrial internationalisation 
through cross-border consolidation 
Bottom-up initiatives from the arms 
industries 
(2) Progressive framing of a CSDP 
Top-down processes initiated through 
political actors (3) Institutional advances in the 
organisation of European armaments 
(Source: author’s own production, incorporating elements of Meyer and Strickmann (2011)) 
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Accordingly, NATO reduced its linear defensive posture and both NATO and (former) WTO 
members largely withdrew their troops and equipment from Central and Western Europe.  
For a brief initial period, the mediation of these changed material conditions with existing 
ideational and material structures resulted in a more idealistic attitude towards armaments. 
European governments radically reduced defence budgets, seeking to reap the so-called ‘peace 
dividend’ and please their electorates’ demands for increased investments into national welfare. 
At the same time, there was a widespread belief, reflected in the RMA doctrine, but also a 
remnant of the Cold War arms race, that potential differentials in numbers during combat could 
be off-set through superiority in the technological quality of military equipment.  
A contestation of these assumptions arose when the state of Europe’s militaries was put to a 
sobering test in its immediate neighbourhood: Former Yugoslavia. Especially in the case of Kosovo 
in 1999, European equipment turned out to be too little, outdated, or simply not apt to the 
operational constraints in place. US air capabilities, already successfully proven during the Gulf 
War, largely sustained NATO’s air campaign. The campaign, however, also showcased 
technology’s limits in protracted, intra-state conflicts. Contrarily to Kuwait in 1991, the complexity 
of the conflict theatre(s) made it very difficult to take control of air space. Significant civilian 
casualties were incurred, despite safeguards to avoid them.  
At the same time, wider economic trends like the liberalisation of national markets and the 
globalisation of supply chains did not stop at Europe’s arms industries. Governments, too, put 
pressure on defence firms to behave more like ‘conventional’ businesses, rationalise and shoulder 
a greater share of defence R&D expenditure. The often archaic and hierarchical structures of cash-
strapped defence contractors and militaries made it difficult to keep pace with civil industries and 
private entities when it came to fund, generate and market disruptive innovations, especially in 
the field of ICT.   
The result of the chain of cause, mediation and contestation, as described by Meyer and 
Strickmann, was, indeed, change. On the supply side, through a bottom-up dynamic, defence 
firms engaged in several restructuring strategies, including internationalisation through cross-
border consolidation. There was a sequence of vertical integration cases, notably the acquisition 
of electronics companies by traditional weapons platform providers, to keep their technological 
edge. Additionally, the aerospace sector, with its vast costs and therein especially promising 
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efficiency gains through economies of scale and learning, merged into two international 
conglomerates: BAE Systems and the EADS.  
On the demand side, through a top-down process, political actors engaged to improve the 
political and institutional framework for European defence cooperation. This ideational process 
began with the explicit incorporation of the CFSP into the EU Treaties and culminated into a call 
by two of Europe’s biggest defence powers, the UK and France, for an autonomous European 
defence capacity, supported by concrete operational ambitions and a competitive EDTIB. 
Furthermore, the tasks of coordinating European armament cooperation were gradually 
transferred from the NATO ‘offspring’ IEPG, to the WEU, and, eventually, to an organisation with 
pan-European, multi-policy and supranational aspirations: the EU.  
6.3 The characteristics of change 
The specific properties of the ideational change identified (specifically its direction and actors) – 
and thus the problem that Meyer and Strickmann were originally concerned with when 
formulating their theoretical approach – are, however, less straight-forward to determine.  
6.3.1 Direction 
Yes, the post-Cold War material changes led to an ideational change, which did not affirm, but 
challenge the directional status quo in the formerly largely nationalised European defence sector. 
But the 1990s’ move towards closer European armament cooperation did have its limits, which 
are endemic to date.  
Firstly, the material pressures to consolidate highlighted deep-seated differences among the 
national defence industrial strategies of the ‘big three’ European arms producing states – France, 
Germany and the UK. The strong government involvement in the French DTIB was arguably one 
of the reasons why the British BAe and the German Dasa, embodying rather private investment 
and shareholder interests, initially went ahead with their separate merger. When BAe opted for 
MES, this confirmed long-standing fears among the remaining states that the UK favoured its 
‘special relationship’ with the US over the European one. In this sense, of the two 1999 ‘mega-
mergers’, only the EADS did qualify as truly ‘European’. But even in the latter’s case, its corporate 
structure, neatly divided between French and German responsibilities, testified to the overriding 
importance of national influence regarding defence industrial matters.   
  Matthaes (s1912615) 
31 
 
Secondly, the post-Cold War material challenges raised the tensions between states acting as 
arms producers and those (almost) exclusively being arms customers. After the exponential WEU 
enlargement in the 1990s – it went from its seven original members to ten member, six associate, 
five observer, and seven associate partner countries – the largest arms producing states, which 
presented the most significant participants in multi-national cooperation programmes anyway, 
sought more efficient decision-making structures in smaller forums like OCCAR and the LoI. 
Conversely, European states with little or no capacities for producing armaments and therefore 
lower political and economic stakes in the ‘European armaments game’ turned to global markets, 
often the US, to satisfy their equipment needs at a cheaper rate.  
This debate between inclusiveness and effectiveness in European defence cooperation 
persists, as was most recently seen in 2017 with the launch of the Permanent Structured 
Cooperation (PESCO); a previously untested Lisbon Treaty provision enabling closer inter-state 
cooperation in defence, including armaments (Articles 42(6) and 46 Treaty on European Union 
(TEU), and Protocol No 10; see Official Journal of the EU 2012a and 2012c). Germany favoured an 
inclusive approach, whereas France promoted a more exclusive one (Pannier 2017). When it 
became clear that the former would become the reality – 25 EU member states have decided to 
join PESCO (European Council 2017) – France arguably proposed a rival and more focused format, 
the European Intervention Initiative (EII), and courted the UK for it, which is set to leave the EU 
in 2019 due to a popular referendum (Bond 2018).  
It is also important to note that the 1990s’ defence industrial concentration has further 
exacerbated the unequal distribution of arms production capacities in Europe. Today, a handful 
of states (Austria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the UK) 
hosts the most relevant European defence industrial players (Roth 2017). This has important 
implications for the potential implementation of the EDF and its predecessor initiatives for EU-
funded defence R&D: the 2016 Pilot Project (PP) and the 2017 Preparatory Action (PA) (European 
Commission 2017a; EDA 2016). The beneficiary structure of these and related EU funds risks to 
be lop-sided, despite EU declarations to promote civil-military cooperation and Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) participation (European Commission 2016), presumably to 
encourage applications from highly-specialised civil tech companies also situated in smaller 
member states. In a similar vein, the incentives for member states and European Parliament 
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Members to contribute to and adopt the necessary funding under the upcoming MFF are 
susceptible to intra-European disparity.  
Finally, the post-Cold War material changes and their ideational effects also stressed the 
divergences among different industrial sectors regarding their suitability for European armament 
cooperation. Its long history of multi-national cooperation programmes, also in civil business, as 
well as the enormous costs involved in its (pre-)production phases made the aerospace sector a 
natural pioneer for defence industrial integration. Not all sectors, however, were equally 
susceptible to the 1990s’ material pressures and cross-border consolidation. Especially the sector 
for land systems, with significantly lower expenses and almost exclusively national and military 
application, remained largely fragmented. It is telling that, to date, the German-Dutch Boxer 
armoured vehicle is the only notable European collaborative programme in the land sector 
(European Parliament 2013b: 35–49). 
6.3.2 Actors 
Likewise, at first glance, it appears that the characteristics of the post-Cold War material changes 
would have favoured certain actors over others in promoting their ideational solution to the 
problem of existing material capabilities and ideational resources versus emerging strategic, 
technological and economic challenges.      
More precisely, in the inter-organisational contest for organising European armaments, the 
predominantly commercial, technological and industrial implications of these material challenges 
as well as their importance for the evolving European Single Market, seem to have played into 
the hands of the EU, specifically the European Commission and its agencies. Albeit the NATO 
remains indispensable for transatlantic aspects of European defence, in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, the EU superseded the WEU and its WEAG/WEAO as the appropriate organisation for 
dealing with armament matters on the European continent. 
Nonetheless, the institutional organisation of European armament cooperation remains 
characterised by a ‘polycentric’ (DeVore 2013: 1) architecture of multiple, partly overlapping 
entities. Initially, policy-makers saw the incorporation of an EAA within the EU as the first step 
towards morphing these entities into a single, one-stop shop for European armaments (European 
Parliament 2016a: 61). This, however, still has to happen with the 2004 created EDA and the 
OCCAR and LoI coexisting to date, although with slightly changed legal status and functions.  
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For all that can be seen, armament cooperation in Europe stays a strictly intergovernmental 
affair. The OCCAR is designed to accommodate the, often already predetermined, project 
modalities requested by its members through flexible, case-by-case procedures (Schmitt 2003: 
24–26). In spite of being more institutionalised, also in the EDA’s case, its activities are 
constrained to merely assisting the EU member states in developing appropriate CSDP capabilities 
(Official Journal of the EU 2015: Art. 2(1); see also Bátora 2009). The recently increased EDA 
budget and the Delegation Agreements signed with the Commission for implementing the PP and 
PA might invigorate the EDA’s standing within the EU system, but they cannot distract from the 
fundamental institutional limitations identified above.   
Lastly, former Article 223 of the Rome Treaty continues to exert its influence. Now Article 346 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), it provides legal recourse for 
member states regarding the Commission in defence matters with European Economic Area (EEA) 
relevance (Official Journal of the EU 2012b). The article therefore remains prone for abuse by 
states citing security concerns as a pretext to protect their national DTIB. To ameliorate the cross-
border transfer of defence-related products and award of defence contracts, the Commission has 
introduced Directive 2009/43/EC and Directive 2009/81/EC (Official Journal of the EU 2009a and 
2009b). The effective application of these acts, however, is still a salient problem, which is picked 
up again for solution in the current EDAP (European Commission 2016).  
Overall, it is highly debatable whether the specific characteristics of the material changes 
occurring in the 1990s have really benefitted a supranational, pan-European and centralised 
ideational approach towards European armament cooperation. Quite the contrary, the domain 
of armament cooperation in Europe – past and present – appears largely in the firm grip of 
sovereign states.    
6.4 Summary and discussion 
In sum, the analysis of the case study has shown that material changes can have unifying, but also 
dividing ideational effects on European defence.  
With the benefit of almost twenty years of hindsight, it can be resolved that while the strong 
material changes in the post-Cold War period (1989–1999) led to a broader and deeper European 
cooperation in armaments, this ideational change was not as pronounced as it could have been 
given the high magnitude of material change and the vast potential for European states to 
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cooperate in the defence domain. The implications of this imperfect move towards more 
European cooperation in armaments, as has been seen, extend into the EU defence integration 
process at present, to the detriment of closer collaboration.   
That said, the above results of the case study analysis do not discard the utility of Meyer’s and 
Strickmann’s theoretical framework. From the start, the authors did not want to present any 
absolute, one-directional causalities between material and ideational factors. Instead, they 
sought to raise awareness for the variety of interrelations existing between them in the policy 
field of European defence. Indeed, this is what their approach has achieved regarding the case of 
European armament cooperation post-Cold War: The multifaceted interplay of material factors 
(e.g. technological requirements for defence equipment) and ideational factors (e.g. industrial 
cooperation strategies) during a period rife with historical change has been put into focus. 
To be clear: the strong point of Meyer’s and Strickmann’s framework – marrying the 
constructivist focus on ideational resources with the realist emphasis on material structures – can 
become a weakness, too. When it came to applying their eclectic theoretical framework, it was 
difficult to deduce a clear and testable hypothesis. Furthermore, the broad scope of their 
theoretical framework made it challenging to decide which variables to take in and which ones to 
leave out for the investigation. The categories of ‘material factors/change’ and ‘ideational 
factors/change’ were vaguely defined and thus subject to diverging interpretations.  
Nonetheless, as described at the beginning of this Thesis, the defining characteristic of the 
defence sector is its heterogeneity. The defence sector comprises a multitude of interests 
(security, economic), actors (political, military, industrial), and entities (civil, military). Therefore, 
the author is still convinced that a comprehensive theoretical approach like Meyer’s and 
Strickmann’s, which accommodates this complexity and variety of relevant factors, is the best 
option at hand. 
Conclusion  
To conclude, how did the interplay of material and ideational factors fare in shaping European 
armament cooperation post-Cold War? Drawing on the case study guided by Meyer’s and 
Strickmann’s theoretical framework and the subsequent analysis of its findings, it can be 
established that the interaction of material and ideational factors did have a discernible effect on 
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the trajectory of European armament cooperation in the 1990s. Faced with stark material 
pressures (capabilities inadequate to threat, shifts in capability distribution, shifts in affordability 
of capabilities), defence firms consolidated, and European states resolved to carve a distinctly 
European defence policy and institutional organisation of armaments.  
These changes towards closer European armament cooperation, however, were not univocal, 
as a closer look at the direction and actors characterising the ideational process unveiled. The 
authority of the EDA as the appropriate organisation for organising armament cooperation on the 
European continent remains contested by rival institutional formats and sovereign states 
themselves, which continue to claim the final say on the delimitations of arms collaboration. 
Furthermore, instead of narrowing rifts in the predisposition for European cooperation among 
large arms-producing states, between arms-producers and arms-customers, and amidst different 
industrial sectors, the material pressures of the 1990s have widened them.   
The conclusion, that even the exceptionally strong material challenges of the post-Cold War 
period did not lead to a full exploitation of the potential for European cooperation, is highly 
relevant for the EU defence integration process today. Notably, it demonstrates that most of the 
material challenges currently characterising the European defence sector and their ideational 
results are not unparalleled appearances and should thus not be trusted as sole guarantors for 
closer EU defence cooperation. 
Of the material changes, which are said to drive the ongoing EU security and defence policy 
surge, the re-assertion of Russian power on the Eastern flank, the Chinese shot at selective 
leadership, and the post-Arab Spring power struggles pass as comparably novel occurrences. 
Other changes – limited national defence budgets, rising equipment costs, ever-evolving 
technological standards – are variations of themes which have been around since the 1990s and 
even before. In the view of the author, this also applies to the US call for more active burden-
sharing and its political pivot away from Europe, which clearly predates Trump’s 2016 election as 
US President. 
In this context, perhaps the most likely category of material change for creating a more 
integrated approach towards European defence is ‘capabilities inadequate to threat’. Especially 
Russia’s military activity in Europe’s Eastern neighbourhood, starting 2014 in Crimea and 
spreading to the Donbass region, directly contradicts the past drivers of post-Cold War territorial 
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disarmament. Like in the case of Former Yugoslavia, a conflict in Europe’s immediate proximity 
bringing important capabilities shortfalls to the fore might prompt an ideational change towards 
more European defence cooperation, as happened in 1998 through the Saint-Malo Declaration.   
Whether the cohesive ideational momentum produced through ‘capabilities inadequate to 
threat’ can be sustained to carry recently tabled initiatives in European armament collaboration 
like the EDF or PESCO to successful implementation, remains to be seen.    
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Policy recommendations 
In light of the Thesis’ findings, some closing policy recommendations regarding the current EU 
defence integration process can be issued. They primarily address European states and their 
national policy-makers, as they still determine the course of the CFSP, to which the CSDP and 
European armament cooperation are subordinated. But they are also of concern for the European 
Commission and the European Parliament, with their right of initiative and last word on the 
adoption of the EU budget respectively. 
  
Policy recommendations for the ongoing EU defence integration process, with a specific 
emphasis on European armament cooperation 
 To preclude confusion on the institutional level, existing armament cooperation 
formats on the European continent (notably OCCAR and the LoI) should be integrated 
under a common organisational umbrella. Given the steps taken so far, the EU and its 
EDA appear the most appropriate candidates for this purpose. 
 To bolster its authority beyond coordinating tasks, the EDA should be entrusted with 
more strategic assignments. This necessitates a clear recognition from the EU member 
states of the agency as their institutional forum of choice for all matters concerning 
European armament cooperation. 
 Despite this unitary approach, important divergences in the preferences of different 
actors in the defence sector cannot be ignored. This applies specially to states with 
large defence industrial capacities and those depending on external sources for 
defence purchases. 
 Instead of accommodating divergences through multiple, overlapping and ad hoc 
collaboration schemes, as it is currently the case, this diversity should become an in-
built feature of the reformed European armament cooperation framework.  
 The overall aim must be a flexible set-up of officially recognised multi-national 
cooperation programmes to which member states can opt-in according to their 
national defence capacities and needs, united under the EDA as chief agency.   
 This would close present loopholes created through parallelly existing agreements and 
strengthen the accountability of the states committing to cooperate.  
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Appendix: Questionnaire 
An English translation of the catalogue of questions provided to the two experts interviewed by 
the author in March 2018 in Brussels follows. The interview candidates asked to be neither 
identified by their name nor by their answers. Notes from the interviews can consequently only 
be provided upon request and with the candidates’ consent.  
 
 
How Did the Interplay of Material and Ideational Factors Shape European Armament Cooperation 
Post-Cold War? 
 
 
Q1: Could you please briefly describe your previous professional experience in the defence 
sector?  
 
Q2: In your opinion, what were the most significant material changes, which confronted the 
European defence sector post-Cold War in the 1990s?  
 
Q3: In your view, did the aforementioned material changes in the 1990s lead to a change in the 
ideational, political attitude of European states towards armament cooperation in Europe?  
 
Q4: If these material challenges did lead to significant ideational changes, could you please name 
concrete examples of the latter?  
 
Q5: In your view, are there any lessons to be learnt from the immediate post-Cold War period in 
the defence sector, which are applicable to the European defence integration process today? 
 
Q6: If so, which ones? 
 
Q7: How do you assess the general influence of experiences from past political initiatives in 
armament cooperation on ongoing European initiatives in this field? Do these experiences ever 
happen to be the subject of professional discussions with your colleagues? 
